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2. Introduction 
The last decade has witnessed a revolution in organizational design. Reengineering - a paradigm 
which called for radical change in the work systems, performance control and information 
systems infrastructure - was largely responsible. See Davenport and Short, (1990), Davenport, 
(1993), Hammer, (1990), Hammer and Champy, (1993), or Brickley, Smith and Zimmerman, 
(1997) for extensive discussion on some of the new organization design philosophies. The 
common theme of these ideas was to transform firms from functionally specialized organizations 
to process oriented organizations (illustrated by the definition of reengineering by Brickley, 
Smith and Zimmerman (1997) - a change in the assignment of tasks, often involving the move 
fiom a functional to a process-oriented organization1). 
These new design principles were backed primarily by citing cases in which they worked. 
(Hammer and Champy, 1993 and Davenport, 1993 list many such cases - some others are 
described in Ballou, 1995, Byrne, 1993, Clark, 1995, Humphrey, 1995 and Zell, 1997). 
However, there has been little formal analysis of this new paradigm. Its results have been mixed 
at best; while a number of organizations have benefited, there has been an astonishing failure 
rate. Having transformed themselves, some firms find that they are unable to handle their 
workload (Boeing being a significant recent example). Other companies, such as Levi Strauss 
(King, 1998), have found that the new ideas of joint compensation and teamwork were markedly 
inferior to their prior system of functional specialization and piece-rate compensation. 
We perceive two explanations for this reported variance in success. One is that some 
organizational transformation efforts fail due to inadequate change management. Resistance to 
change is inevitable, and firms may lack the management techniques required to successfully 
implement new organizational designs. The second explanation, which has not been investigated 
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formally until now, is that some of the principles themselves lead to lower organizational 
efficiency in certain settings. In other words, they may not be universally applicable. However, 
if this is true, then which principles, if any, are universally applicable, and what factors 
determine whether a particular design is suitable for a specific organization? 
The purpose of our paper is to answer these questions. Specifically, we ask: 
1. When is process-oriented organization preferred to functional organization? 
2. What mix of work systems, information systems and incentives are optimal in a particular 
organizational context? 
3. What are the performance trade-offs between simultaneous changes across these 
organizational design factors? 
We rigorously analyze the organization design principles that were motivated by business 
process reengineering, while simultaneously incorporating work system design, incentives and 
information systems variables into our models. We derive a number of interesting results, some 
of which support these principles, and others which do not. Our paper adds to the academic 
literature on process redesign (for instance, Caron and Stoddard, 1995, Clemons, Thatcher and 
Row, 1995, Davenport and Nohria, 1994, Davenport, Jarvenpaa and Beers, 1996, Teng, Jeong 
and Grover, 1998, Jarvenpaa and Ives, 1995, Jarvenpaa and Stoddard, 1995, Seidmann and 
Sundararajan, 1997 and Venkatraman, 1991), and also to the broader areas of information 
technology and organization design (for instance, Brynjolfsson, 1994, Gurbaxani and Whang, 
1990, Huber, 1984, Malone and Smith, 1988, Markus and Robey, 1988, Orlikowski, 1994, 
Radner, 1993 and Sampler and Short, 1994), and the economics of queuing systems (Dewan and 
Mendelson, 1990, Lee and Cohen, 1985, Mendelson, 1985, Mendelson and Whang, 1990, and 
Whang, 1990). 
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Three articles from the academic literature are most similar to this paper, in either approach or in 
methodology. Buzacott (1996) develops a series of queuing models aimed at questioning the 
validity of Hammer and Champy's ten reengineering principles, and concludes, among other 
things, that a high degree of variability is necessary to justify their validity. This paper is 
comprehensive and rigorous. However, by isolating queuing effects, it ignores the crucial 
interactions between the design of work systems, and other motivational and technological 
factors. In the spirit of Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Barua, Whinston and Lee (1996) recognize 
that information technology and organizational changes may be complementary. They develop 
an axiomatic framework that captures this possibility, and show, under rigorous assumptions, 
that certain organizational changes may be complementary to information technology changes. 
More recently, Brynjolfsson and van Alstyne (1997) have developed a simple framework and 
software package which enables managers to study such complementary interactions. 
What sets our research apart from these papers is our interdisciplinary approach that 
simultaneously capture the operational aspects of organizations, and the rich interactions caused 
by the increased employee component and the central role of information systems that 
characterize modern service organizations. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe our modeling framework in $2. In 
$3, we outline our model and state a lemma that enables us to solve agency problems in a variety 
of queuing systems. We then describe the details of hct ional  and process-oriented 
organizations in $4 and $5 ,  derive optimal contracts and cost functions for firms adopting one or 
the other form of organization, and state some results about the relation between information 
asymmetry and agency costs . In $6, we analyze these analytical results from the prior sections, 
graphically illustrate the trade-offs between hc t iona l  and process organization, and describe the 
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complementarity and substitutability between different organizational variables in each case. 
Finally, we discuss the managerial insights of our research in $7, and conclude in $8. 
2. A Framework for Modeling Organizations 
The first step towards successfully designing a organization is determining what parameters 
influence its performance. The next step is to recognize which of those parameters are variable, 
and which of those cannot be changed by the firm. For instance, both the level of customization 
demanded by a customer, and the level of skill-enhancing technology available to an empowered 
worker influence the performance of the organization. However, only the latter can be explicitly 
chosen by a manager. For those familiar with solving optimization problems, these steps 
correspond to identifying the parameters of the problem, and determining which of these 
parameters are variables. The parameters that can be chosen are termed internal design 
variables. The factors that are not controlled by the firm are classified into job-speczjk factors 
and external factors. The internal design variables fall into three broad categories: variables that 
determine the information systems and architecture, variables that describe employee incentives, 
and variables that describe operational work design. The framework is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Information systems: Information systems that have the most significant impact on the 
performance of an organization cause at least one of three effects. They enable superior access 
to information, they expand worker skills and expertise, and they increase processing speed. 
Some information systems result in more than one of these effects. Others may have a positive 
effect on one dimension and a negative effect on others. The central point here is that managers 
and workers desire one or more of these effects when they acquire information systems. 
Therefore, we model these effects, rather than explicit hardware and software choices, since this 
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will not only indicate what mix of technology is optimal in a particular setting, but will also 
predict and recommend the direction of future systems development and research. 
Incentives: A striking difference between the organizational design and management in 
manufacturing and service firms is the relatively higher impact of performance measurement and 
control in service organizations. Modeling and optimizing performance in manufacturing 
processes is relatively easy - the machines that do the work in the process are much less reliant 
on human factors. This is probably one of the reasons why the philosophies of Adam Smith and 
Frederick Taylor that worked so well for assembling products were found lacking in service 
organizations. We explicitly consider the performance measures used by the organization, and 
the employee reward system that these measures form an input to. These variables are consistent 
with those commonly used in the performance control literature. See, for instance, Brickley, 
Smith & Zimmerman, (1 997) or Eisenhardt, (1 985) 
Work Design: The final set of decision variables describes the architecture of work and 
information flows in the organization. We explicitly model task allocation and sequencing, and 
their associated information flows - whether tasks are done sequentially by different workers, 
or whether sets of tasks are allocated to a single worker or team of workers. 
Job-specific parameters: This set consists of the internal parameters that influence the 
performance of the organization, and are intrinsic to the work done in the process (they cannot be 
chosen). They include knowledge intensity (what skills and supporting information are required 
to complete the tasks), the magnitude of information that 'flows with the job' (how much 
customer-specific information does the job require), the characteristics of the workers (their 
preferences, risk aversion and effort aversion), the sizes of different 'pieces' of a job, and the 
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technology responsiveness of the firm and its employees (how high the returns from the 
technology effects described are). 
External characteristics: Organization design cannot be insulated from the characteristics of 
the customer; in fact, the concept of 'customer centered' processing is one of the focal points of 
modern organizations. Our framework includes customer characteristics such as variability in 
demand specifications (degree of customization required), time preferences (the magnitude of 
their delay costs), and the market demand at a particular level of service (the demand function) 
3. Model 
We model an organization with one principal and n identical agents. (See Jensen and Mecking, 
1976, or Eisenhardt, 1985, for a discussion of agency theory in organizations). The principal 
attempts to maximize her net profit function by inducing certain effort levels from the agents. 
The effort levels of the n agents are not directly observable. However, they jointly influence a 
stochastic performance measure. It may not be possible to isolate the individual contribution of 
each agent to the performance measure. This performance measure affects the profits of the 
principal. A closed-form expression for the density function of the distribution of the 
performance measure is may not be known. However, the Laplace transform of this density 
function is known (see Smith, 1976, for an exposition of Laplace transform theory). The density 
function underlying the Laplace transform has moments that exist and are finite. This represents 
a general model of service organizations, where each agent controls the processing rate of a 
queue, and the overall cycle time of the process, which is the net sojourn time in the queuing 
network is the only observable performance measure that affects the profits of the firm. Some 
notation used is summarized below. 
U(x): Utility function of the agents in the process; the argument x is monetary compensation. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-99-08 
E: Set of possible effort levels. 
LR = (01, 02, ...., an) : Effort level vector of the n workers; oi E E 'Ji. A higher value of oi 
represents a higher effort. 
[LR.,,oO] = (WI, 02, ....,oi.~,~,oi+l,..., q ): Effort level vector with the irh component replaced 
by oo. 
~ ( o ) :  Cost to each agent of exerting effort o ,  measured in monetary units. 
A - ILR) : Density function of observable performance measure if workers work at effort 
levels LR. 
F*(s la): Laplace transform o f A -  la). 
(a,b) = (a], az, . . .,ad, @I,  bz . . . bJ : Contracts offered to the n agents. 
Uo : Reservation utility of the workers. 
nb): Profits to the principal (excluding compensation costs) if observed performance 
measure is y. 
An crucial assumption is made: that the contracts offered to the agents are linear in the 
performance measure i.e. if the observed measure is y, then agent i is paid a,+-bg. The utility 
function we use is contained in the class of functions for which linearity is optimal (as discussed 
in Ross, 1974), and the probability assessments of uncertainty are identical for both the principal 
and the agents, in that both have identical knowledge about the behavior of the random 
performance measure for a given set of actions. Besides, a non-linear contract, apart from being 
uncommon in practice, renders our problem intractable except when the agents are risk-neutral.. 
At this point, the principal's problem can be formulated. 
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The objective function of the principal is expected net profits (profits less compensation costs). 
The first constraint ensures that each of the workers get their minimum reservation utility. The 
second constraint ensures that, given the contract (ai,bi), each component mi* of the effort level 
vector R* induced provides each worker with the maximum possible utility, given the effort 
level of the other workers (thus yielding a Nash equilibrium solution for the inter-agent game). 
See Grossman and Hart (1983), or Holmstrom (1979, 1982) for more details on the assumptions 
and formulation of single and multi-agent principal-agent problems 
The following lemma establishes that (PI) can be reformulated in closed form as a minimization 
problem. The proof of this lemma is not exposited. It follows directly from the definition of the 
Laplace transform, and the fact that profit maximization and cost minimization are equivalent for 
the profit function specified. 
Lemma 1: If U(x) is identical and negative exponential for all agents, i.e. U(x)  = -e-Ox, and xl/YI 
is linear and decreasing in y, i.e. ~ ( y )  = .no - c ~ y ,  then (PI) has the following closed-form 
formulation 
a; E arg ma~[-e -" '~~)F*  ( q  bJ 1 [Q: a])] Vj. 
weE 
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A much more general form of this result is proved in a companion paper (to ensure author 
anonymity, this paper is not cited. A copy of this result can be sent to reviewers upon 
request). 
In the subsequent sections, we place some more structure on our model of the organization, and 
use Lemma 1 to derive closed form solutions for optimal contracts and overall objective 
functions in functional and process-oriented organizations. 
4. Functional Organization 
In a functional organization, the n agents are modeled as specialists who perform the tasks in a 
job sequentially. Each job consists of n tasks, and each specialist is assigned one task. When the 
specialist receives responsibility over the job, it joins the queue of pending work for that 
specialist. After completing the relevant task, the specialist passes responsibility to the next 
agent, who receives it immediately. This immediacy is a reflection the advent of workflow 
automation software and intranet technology in today's workplaces, and allows one to focus on 
more subtle issues, such as the need for information transfers and the effects of specialization. 
When a specialist begins to perform the required task, she must first spend time reading job 
specifications, inferring particular customer requirements and understanding the nature of what 
has already been performed by reading summaries of preceding tasks. After the nature of the job 
has been understood, the specialist performs the task. Finally, she may prepare information to be 
transferred and read by the succeeding workers. Our model divides the time taken for these 
activities into two categories. One of these is the task processing time of the agent. This is 
assumed to be exponentially distributed. When the worker works at effort level a' E E, the 
parameter of this distribution is correspondingly p,. The workers chose from two levels of effort 
mL and mH (which correspond to processing rates of p~ and pH) The other component is the 
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handoff delay o;  this incorporates the pre and post processing activities. The degree of 
customization determines the value of o,  since higher levels of customization would correspond 
to lengthier and more complex customer specifications, and consequently, more pre-processing 
time. This is a widely documented drawback of functional organization (see Davenport, 1993, 
Hammer and Champy, 1993) -- it causes all workers to repeatedly have to incur a delay of o. If 
all of the job's tasks were performed by the same worker, then there would be no need for these 
intra-job information transfers. 
The design of our model allows us to represent the cycle time at each worker as the sojourn time 
of an M/G/l queue2. The queues have an arrival rate equal to the rate of arrivals into the system 
(A) and a processing time which is distributed as a shifted exponential. If the effort level of a 
worker is or yielding a processing rate Pi and the handoff delay is o,  then the processing time of 
each queue is has the density fbnction 
The corresponding processing time distributions in the queues are denoted g,(y)and 
g,(y) respectively. Also, define the cost of effort c, = c(w'), w' E (aL, wH) 
Two forms of information asymmetry are analyzed. The first, termed complete asymmetry is 
where the principal can only observe the cycle time of the entire job, and each agent can observe 
only the processing time of her task. The other, termedpartial asymmetry, is where the principal 
can observe the cycle time of each agent individually - in this case, it is immaterial whether the 
agents can observe each others' cycle time, as the principal is free to contract with each agent 
individually. In either case, the value of o is known to the principal and the agents before 
contracting. However, although the principal has full information about the value of o,  the best 
measure upon which a contract can be written is the entire cycle time of the agent's task as the 
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presence of the handoff delay influences queuing time as well, and therefore, a measure based 
solely on p cannot be separated out. Figure 2(a) depicts these information symmetry situations. 
Only each agent can see what is inside her box. All the agents and the principal can see what is 
outside the dotted box. An indicator variable q is used to represent information asymmetry. q = 0 
represents partial asymmetry, and q = 1 represents complete asymmetry. 
The following lemma characterizes the expected cycle time of each worker. 
Lemma 2: If an agent works at an effort level that induces a processing rate pi , and the arrival 
rate of jobs is A, the expected cycle time for the agent is 
Proofi The processing time of each server is distributed as 
g(x;ol) = p ,e -p i (x -") ;  x E [(T, a). 
The Laplace transform of this distribution is 
and the activity rate at each server is 
1 h p, = A(-+(T)=-+ ho. 
PI P ,  
By the Pollaczek-Khinchin transform equation (see Kleinrock, 1976), the system time at each 
server has a distribution whose Laplace transform is given by 
which solves to 
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G;[s;or]  = s ( ~ i  -A - AP~C~) ( s  + pi)(s - A)em + Ay, 
The expected service time at each server is given by 
a ~ " [ s ;  o' ] lim - 
s+O as 
Differentiating, and using L'Hospital's rule twice yields 
( l - o ~ + o p ,  -+) 
lim - - 
s+O 8s (M - A - 
The principal has the option of choosing to offer activity based compensation (a flat fee for each 
job completed). If this is the case, the workers all work at effort level p~ This may occur if the 
cost of offering performance-based compensation outweighs its benefits. The principal chooses 
the contract that minimizes total costs. 
The new notation introduced in this section is summarized below: 
p Exponential processing rate of specialist at effort level mi E {aL, oH} 
ci : Cost of effort per task for a specialist at effort level oi E {aL, oH}. 
g(y;  y , )  = g,  ( y )  : Server processing time density at effort level oi E {aL, oH} ;
T, ( y , ,  A) : Expected sojourn time in an M/G/l queue with arrival rate L! and 
processing time distribution g ( j ;  pi). 
Propositions 1 and 2 characterize the incentive contracts and system performance of this 
organization design. 
Proposition 1 
In a functional organization with specialists, if a performance-based compensation scheme is 
chosen, the identical optimal contract (a, b) offered to all the specialists solves 
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Pro08 There are two effort levels, and the agents seek pure strategy Nash equilibria. Therefore, 
the only rationale for having a performance-based incentive scheme is if it induces all the 
workers to work at oH. The agents have identical preferences, and identical job sizes, and hence, 
by symmetry, the optimal contracts offered to the will be identical, inducing identical effort 
levels. By Lemma 1, the contract (a, b) chosen must satisfy: 
Since o can take only two values, it follows that (a, b) must solve 
This is referred to as Condition 1. 
Partial asymmetry: In this case, Condition 1 is equivalent to 
where G; [s; wH ] is as defined in the proof of Lemma 2. The first equation reduces to 
which yields the equality for b when ~ i [ ~ b ; o ~  ] and G; [rlb;oL 7 are substituted for. 
Solving the second equation for a yields 
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Substituting for G; [qb; wH ] & multiplying by no yields the result in its stated form. 
Complete asymmetry: 
~*[r lb,(o~,0~, . . ,w,) l= ~i[qb;w,l~~[qb;o~]....~i[qb;w~]. 
This result follows from the fact that the work system described is a product form queuing 
network with n servers in tandem. Condition 1 now reduces to 
H 
- e-Ma-c~/ ] ( ~ i [ ~ b ; ~  1)" = -e-q[a-c~ 1 (G; [q b; oH I)~- '  G; [q b; wL], 
- e-rl[a-c~ I H n ( ~ i [ r l b ; o  I) = U,. 
Canceling terms and simplifying the first equation as in the case for partial asymmetry yields the 
equality for b. Solving for a yields 
Substituting the expression for ~ ; [ ~ b ; o ~ ]  and using log(yx) = x log(y) yields the result for a in 
its stated form. QED 
Proposition 2 
The principal's cost per job is given by 
Proof If the principal does not adopt an incentive compensation scheme, she must pay the 
agents their reservation wage. This is simply the wage that ensures their reservation utility. Let 
this wage be w. It is easily seen that 
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The agents work at rate p ~ ,  which yields an expected cycle time of TS(pL, h) per task. Hence, the 
total costs incurred are 
On the other hand, if the principal uses an incentive scheme, the agents work at rate p ~ .  The 
cycle time per task is therefore T,(pH, A) and the expected system cycle time is n T7(pH, A) . 
Partial asymmetry: The expected compensation per worker is 
a + bE(tasktime) = a + bTT(pH,A). 
Complete asymmetry: The expected compensation per worker is 
a + bE(systemtime) = a + bnTT (pH ,A). 
Given that q = 0 under partial asymmetry, q = 1 under complete asymmetry and there are n 
workers, the total expected costs to the principal are: 
C = nc,T, (pH, A) + nb[nqT, (pH )] + nu. 
The principal chooses the compensation scheme that minimizes costs. The result follows. QED. 
Proposition 1 describes the form of the optimal linear incentive contract. Note that the factor b 
has the same value, irrespective of the information asymmetry. This should not be 
misinterpreted as the variable component of compensation being the same in both situations. 
Under complete asymmetry, the performance measure is the cycle time of the entire job; hence 
the magnitude of the realized variable component of compensation (b multiplied by the observed 
cycle time of the entire job) is far higher than in the case of partial asymmetry (where it is b 
multiplied by the observed cycle time of a single task). This component increases approximately 
linearly with n, which is intuitively appealing, because as n increases, the problem of free riding 
becomes increasingly more difficult. The fact that b turns out to have identical values is due to a 
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property of the Laplace transform of the density function of a sum of independent random 
variables. 
Proposition 2 is easily explained in words. The first term inside the curly parentheses in each 
case is the total expected cost with an activity based compensation scheme. The second term is 
the total expected cost with a performance-based incentive scheme. Notice that in both 
asymmetry situations, the first term is the same - this is trivially true because with no incentive 
scheme, information asymmetry becomes meaningless. 
We now state a corollary which distinguishes the relative impact of agency costs in each 
information asymmetry situation. Its proof is not detailed: it is evident from examination of the 
two propositions. 
Corollary I 
(I) At a particular level of agent effort, costs due to delay are independent of the 
information asymmetry, and are linear in the number of workers. 
(II) q i t  is optimal to use a performance-based compensation scheme, then 
a) Under partial asymmetry, agency costs are linear in the number of workers. 
b) Under complete asymmetry, agency costs are quadratic in the number of workers. 
This corollary indicates the primary cost driver in a sequential system with complete asymmetry 
and a large number of workers is not only due to handoffs and queuing delays; in fact, as n 
grows, the impact of agency costs becomes increasingly more important. Two insights can be 
drawn from this result. The first is that agency costs are rarely cited as a driver of process 
redesign. The convexity of these costs in the number of workers may partially explain why long 
sequential systems are inefficient, even when specialization gains are significant. The second is 
that there is tremendous added value from an information system that moves a firm from 
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complete to partial asymmetry. Workflow automation software is one example of such a system. 
Again, the gains from such information systems are always interpreted as being a result of 
reduced reconciliation costs and better co-ordination - however, reduction in agency costs is a 
potentially significant reason for adopting this expensive technology 
It is difficult to interpret these results further using comparative statics, due to the complexity of 
the derived cost functions. However, using numerical optimization, a number of useful insights 
are derived from them; these are discussed in $6. 
5. Process oriented organization 
In this organizational architecture, the n agents are modeled as case managers who work in 
parallel. When a job arrives in the organization, it is sent to one of the n case managers, who 
performs all the n tasks of the job. This model depicts a common work system in process- 
oriented corporations (the most well-known example being that of IBM Credit from Hammer 
and Champy, 1993). Though this eliminates handoff delays, it presents the new problems. Due 
to a loss of specialization and barriers to accessing specialized information systems, at any given 
effort level, the processing rate per task of the case managers will not be as high as it was in the 
case of functional specialists. In addition, their skills are not broad enough for them to handle all 
the jobs that come to them; they need the intervention of an expert for the more difficult jobs. 
Typically, these problems are partially alleviated by using two types of information systems: 
speed enhancing systems (decentralized information access systems like regular client-server 
systems or intranets3, and productivity tools) and sMN expanding systems (expert systems and 
knowledge management systems). The level of technology in each of these types of systems is 
represented by €I1 and €I2 respectively. 
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These two effects - loss in productivity and skill reduction - are modeled separately. The 
parameter a represents the drop in processing rate per task when tasks are consolidated. a 
depends on a0 (the reduction in productivity when there is no new IS support, representative of 
the knowledge intensity of the tasks), and t, the rate of returns from information technology. The 
explicit functional form of a assumed is a = 1 - a,e-'e: . The second parameter P represents the 
exception rate of the process, i.e. the percentage of arrivals diverted to an expert due to 
inadequate worker knowledge about all tasks. P depends on Po (the exception rate when there is 
-16: 
no IS support), and 8 2 .  The functional form of P is P(8,) = p,e . t is an absolute measures of 
the returns per dollar due to increased technology levels. 8 1  and €I2 are representative of 
technology spending. 
Since the workers are processing n tasks per job, their processing rate is also factored down by 
lln. Hence, at an effort level o', the processing rate per job of the generalist will be ap,ln. In 
addition, the workers need to examine job requirements, specific information pertaining to a 
particular customer as well. However, they need to do this exactly once, and this results in a 
delay of o. The processing time distribution at each server is therefore a shifted exponential 
distribution with parameters ap,ln and o. 
There is only one information asymmetry situation; partial asymmetry. The principal can 
observe the cycle time of each agent, and therefore contracts with them individually. The cost 
per job to the agent is the sum of the costs of the n individual tasks4, and is therefore nc, at an 
effort level o'. To facilitate comparison between the systems, the expert is assumed to be 
external to the agency conflict. Normally, the expert is a person who is employed for the purpose 
of doing other value-adding work. Exception rerouting to this expert costs the firm at a rate 
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equal to the value of her time. A clean way to model this scenario is to assume that the principal 
does this work; it is done at a rate w, and at a personal cost proportional to the cycle time of the 
tasks. Since the information relating to the specific job instance has to be transferred to the 
expert every time a job is sent, the expert is delayed by o per job, and has a resulting processing 
time which has a shifted exponential distribution with parameters o and p ~ .  The personal cost 
(due to spending time that could have been spent on other value-adding work) is measured at a 
rate CE per unit time, and is over and above the delay cost borne by the firm. 
The additional notation introduced is summarized below. 
a a Reduction in the agent's processing rate due to loss of specialization. 
• P Percentage of jobs rerouted to an expert. 
a 0  Reduction in the agent's processing rate in the absence of supporting IS. 
• Po Exception rate in the absence of supporting IS. 
• t Returns to information technology. 
• CE Additional cost per unit time of the jobs rerouted to the expert. 
a p ~  Processing rate of the expert. 
el,e2 Spending on information systems for speed enhancing and skill expanding 
The following proposition characterizes performance in the process-oriented organization: 
Proposition 3 
The optimal incentive contract (a, b) offered to all the case managers is 
qb(napH -nh-hapHo) 
v un eqb" (nq b + ap ,  )(nq b - h)  + hpH 
(nap, - nh - hap,o)enCL" 
- 
(napH -nh - hapHo)eCfi" 
eqhCT(nqb + ap,)(nqb - h)  + hp, e"" (nqb + apH )(nqb - A) + hpH 
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Proof The processing rate at each case manager is apiln and the arrival rate is hln. Analysis 
similar to that in Lemma 2 yields the Laplace transform of the system time at each case manager 
as: 
s(nayi - nh - hay  ,o) G;[s;o i]  = (ns + api )(ns - h)es" + hy ,  
By Corollary 3.2.1, the optimal contract (a,b) must solve 
This is very similar in form to Condition 1 of Proposition 1 under partial aspmetry.  The 
expression for b that results is 
Similarly, solving the second equation for a yields 
I - 1  1 
a = nc, +-log(-)+-log(G;[qb;wH]). 
q un rl 
Substituting the expression for G*~( . )  in these two equations yields the desired result. QED 
Proposition 4 
The cost per job to the principal is 
~ P H  1 
c~ [Ts (-7-1 + pTs ( P P E  '11 ' 'l?PTs ( P P E  7') 
n n 
~ W H  + a+ bT,.(-,--) 
n n 
C ( ~ L , ~ H , ~ E 7 h , a , P )  =min 
avr, 
~ D [ T $  (-7-1 + PTs ( P P E  + CEPT ( P P E  
n n 
1 -1 + nc, + --log- 
rl u n  
Proof If the principal does not adopt an incentive compensation scheme, she must pay the 
agents the wage that ensures their reservation utility. Let this wage be w. It follows that 
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The expected cycle time is the expected time spent by the agent plus the expected time spent by 
the expert per job. This is simply 
which follows from the definition of T, , the arrival and processing rates of the agents and the 
expert, and the fact that a fraction p of the jobs are exceptions. The total non-compensation costs 
are therefore 
where the third term is the cost of the expert's time per job. Adding this to the compensation cost 
yields the total cost without an incentive contract. 
If the principal offers an incentive contract, the expected compensation costs per job are 
The agents work at a rate a p ~ l n ,  and the arrival rate is hln. Analysis similar to that for the 
previous case yields the total non-compensation costs: 
Computing total costs in each case, and recalling that the principal minimizes total costs yields 
the desired result, QED. 
6.  Analysis 
The analytical results obtained in the previous section do not allow for significant comparative 
static analysis, as they are very complicated, and their first derivatives are not intuitively 
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appealing. Hence, we have conducted extensive numerical optimization using these closed-form 
expressions as a starting point. 
To examine simultaneous changes in different organizational parameters, two-dimensional 
projections of the parameter space are plotted. As these parameters vary, the regions in which 
different combinations of information systems, compensation schemes and work design are 
optimal are examined, and the points of transition from one optimal design to another are 
plotted. This provides a very intuitive graphical picture of how changes in parameter values 
affected design choices. 
Without loss of generality, and for notational simplicity, we normalize the value of p~ to 1 and 
p~ to h. We also restrict the value of o to lie in [O,l] and interpret this value as the handoff delay 
measured as a fraction of the expected processing time, UpL. While o may actually be greater 
than 1, that interval is uninteresting, as it corresponds to situations with unduly large handoff 
delays, resulting in a clear case for process-oriented organization. h is restricted to the interval 
(0,)(1 + o)) to ensure that queuing delays are finite under both the absence and presence of 
incentive compensation. We further normalize c~ to 1 (this is reasonable, since it simply 
represents a change in currency units, which can be accounted for by adjusting q) and assume 
that the cost of effort is linear in the effort; i.e., cH=h. h can be interpreted as a measure of the 
difficulty of the task. Normalizing log[-l/Uo] to zero is equivalent to an identical linear shift in 
the expected cost under any process design. This leaves the results unaltered, since a cost of 
log[-l/Uo] is borne per employee irrespective of the nature of the organization design, and one is 
contrasting different organization designs. We then determine a level of information technology 
for the process-oriented organization, and solve for the optimal value of b for both the fimctional 
and process-oriented organizations respectively, given a certain set of parameter values. Next, 
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the values of a and the cost functions for each work system are derivable. These figures are 
compared within each work system to derive the optimal level of Q1 and Q2. These optimal cost 
figures are compared across organization designs, and one of the four choices - 
(functional/process oriented, fixedincentive compensation) is chosen. Varying the parameters 
two at a time enables us to plot indifference cones - lines that divided the 2x2 parameter space 
into regions where respective designs are optimal (this is done by seeing where they become 
equivalent - these sucessive points of equivalence define an indifference line). 
A few of these indifference charts are shown in Figures 3 and 4, and focus on the five parameters 
which we found to be the most significant determinants of organization design choice. Figure 
3(a) and 3(b) illustrate the effects of level of customization (o), the work intensity (AlpL) and the 
returns to I.T. (t)  on the optimal choice of organization. As shown, an increase in either the level 
of customization or the work intensity causes process-oriented organization to become optimal. 
However, this effect is much more pronounced when the returns to information technology t 
increase, as shown by a much larger area of optimality for process-oriented organization in 
Figure 3(b). Figures 3(c) and 3(d) plot similar results while varying the knowledge intensity ( a  
and P ) ~  , the work intensity (Alpd and the returns to I.T. (t). Note that an increase in knowledge 
intensity (represented by a decrease in a )  results in functional organization being more desirable. 
Again, this effect is compounded by the increase in returns to I.T. 
A very interesting result here is the relationship between information technology and 
performance-based incentives. As illustrated by Figure 3(a) and 3(c), when returns from I.T. are 
low, process oriented organization is often accompanied by incentive pay. The corresponding 
values of Q1 and Q2 (derived as described earlier) are low, corresponding to a low level of I.T. 
investment. These values of Q1 and Q2 increase significantly when the returns from I.T. are high 
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- there is a higher investment level in technology --- but this is accompanied by the elimination 
of incentive pay in process-oriented organizations, as shown in Figures 3(b) and 3(d). Therefore, 
information technology and incentives appear to be substitutes in a process-based organization. 
We discuss this further in $7. 
Figure 4 strengthens the conclusions that higher customization and activity rates favor process- 
oriented organization, while higher knowledge intensity favors functional organization (note that 
this trend is illustrated in all four charts). In addition, surprisingly, at the same level of work 
intensity and customization/knowledge intensity, an increase in the number of tasks results in 
process-oriented organization being optimal in a larger number of cases. This counters the 
intuition that functional specialization is favored when there are a larger number of tasks in a job. 
The result is driven by the fact that longer 'chains' of tasks are affected more by handoffs. These 
charts illustrate the case of partial asymmetry - complete asymmetry would strengthen this result 
further (as discussed in corollary 1) 
Our analysis yielded another significant result, which is also evident from a closer examination 
of Figure 3 and 4. Both incentives and information technology complement the move to process- 
based organization. The former can be seen clearly in figures 3(a), 3(c), and 4(a)-(d), where a 
majority of the area where process-based organization is favorable also features incentives as a 
part of the optimum. The latter follows from our result that when incentives don't feature (such 
as in 3.b. and 3.d.), information technology levels are high. As mentioned earlier, these two are 
almost mutually exclusive, suggesting a strong substitutability between technology investments 
and performance-based incentives. 
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7. Discussion and Managerial Insights 
Perhaps the most significant result of our analysis is that typical changes in work organization, 
incentive compensation and information systems do not always appear to be complementary. In 
fact, in a very large number of cases, while the adoption of process-oriented organization and 
information technology appear to complement one another, as do the adoption of process- 
oriented organization and performance-based incentives, information systems and performance- 
based incentives appear to be substitutable drivers of process performance improvement. Most 
prescriptive essays on I.T. enabled design in service organizations (e.g. Hammer and Champy, 
1993) consistently recommend simultaneously adopting a process orientation, introducing output 
based pay and using advanced information technology to enhance skills and productivity. 
However, as our results indicate, this approach is frequently not optimal, and that choosing on 
two out of the three is typically the best solution. While this does not constitute a formal proof 
of complementarity/substitutability, it is a testable hypothesis that our modeling results strongly 
support. . 
Although this result seems very counter-intuitive, we can explain why it arises. There is aJixed 
cost of sorts to switching to performance-based incentives; it is not a continuous variable cost 
(you either have them, or you don't). If the returns from information technology are low, it is 
optimal to bear this cost, as its benefits are more cost-effective when compared to introducing 
advanced information technology. As the returns to technology increase, this option becomes 
relatively less favorable, until a breakpoint is reached, where it becomes sub-optimal to bear this 
cost. Now, given that one is not introducing incentives, the desirability of technology-based 
performance enhancers increases significantly; hence the optimal process design is characterized 
by high levels of information technology. 
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Another salient result is our demonstration of the optimality of functional organization in a 
number of situations. The reengineering revolution of the early 1990's has resulted in the almost 
absolute rejection of the value of functional specialization. However, it can be ideal in a number 
of situations; specifically, when work is knowledge intensive, when jobs have few tasks, and 
when work intensity is naturally low. Following the widespread move to process-based 
organization, many companies are currently wrestling with the problem of managing their 
knowledge, and are consequently implementing expensive knowledge management information 
systems. However, functional organization provides a natural environment for managing 
functional knowledge - an insight that could help many of these companies in their efforts in this 
direction. 
A summary our the managerial insights from our models is presented below: 
Process-oriented organization is desirable when the typical job in the firm has a large number 
of sub-parts, when the firm's customers demand increased customization, and when there is 
significant information asymmetry between workers and management. 
Functional organization is desirable when jobs are knowledge intensive, when there are low 
returns from information technology, if seasonal variation requires low activity rates and when 
the typical process in the firm has few sub-parts. 
Performance based incentives are optimal in a process-oriented organization when jobs have 
a large number of parts , and the constituent tasks require lower specialization. They tend to be 
sub-optimal when returns from technology are higher. Also, as mentioned earlier, they tend to 
complement job redesign. 
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In functional organizations, technology such as workflow systems which track where a job is 
at any given time have benefits beyond job control and co-ordination - the also significantly 
increase the cost-effectiveness of performance-based incentive compensation. 
8. Conclusion and Future Research 
This paper represents is the first comprehensive study of the trade-offs between specialized and 
process oriented forms of organization. It approaches an essentially interdisciplinary problem 
from an interdisciplinary perspective. In the light of the complementarity results that have been 
obtained, it is unlikely that subsequent single-dimensional models will have much predictive 
value. Towards this end, results like Lemma 1 contributes techniques that will aid future 
interdisciplinary research in information technology and organizational design. 
The analysis of models that simultaneously incorporate queuing and agency theory can be 
extremely complicated. Some of the difficulty is overcome by using transform techniques and 
numerical methods; however, the tradeoff between realistic models and mathematical tractability 
is bound to cause difficulty. However, they still have immense potential as strategic guidelines. 
We have informally validated some of the results by case-based testing at a couple of Fortune 
100 companies, and are working on testing them empirically. 
Most importantly, our results finally gives managers concrete guidelines for organization design 
that are context specific. Instead of broad suggestions from popular books, process owners will 
have results that are applicable to their specific needs. Hopefully, we have provided the first 
building block of a comprehensive normative theory of IT-enabled organization design and 
implementation. 
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Figure 1 Modeling framework 
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Figure 2: Work design and information asymmetry in functional/process oriented organizations 
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Hammer and Champy (1993) define a process as a related group of tasks that together create 
value for the customer. Davenport (1993) defines a process as a speczfic ordering of work 
activities, with a beginning, an end, and clearly identzfied inputs and outputs: a structure for 
action. We model processes in organizations in the spirit of these definitions. 
~nforhmate l~ ,  the departure process of an M/G/l queue is not Poisson. However, we are not 
explicitly modeling a specific physical system here; we are modeling cycle time at each 
processing station as the sojourn time of a widely used queue. 
The barriers to information access are modeled as reducing the effective rate at which the tasks 
are processed; hence information access systems here have the effect of increasing processing 
rates. 
It is easy to be misled into thinking that this is equivalent to assuming a linear cost structure. 
However, this is not the case. The convex nature of the cost of effort is based on the amount of 
work done in a fixed time period, and the personal cost increases at an increasing rate in the 
amount of work an agent does in a working day. In this case, the agent does the same volume of 
work in a given time period - instead of doing n instances of the same task, she does n 
potentially different tasks. Hence the cost of doing these n tasks remains the same. There may 
be a cost associated with switching between tasks; this can be assumed to balance the reduction 
in cost due to lowering of monotony. 
While both a and P are inverse measures of knowledge intensity, the results obtained from 
varying P were highly sensitive to the processing rate of the expert p ~ .  (an increase in P causes 
both 1-1 and h to reduce by a factor of (1-P), which does not change agent activity rates). We can 
therefore conclude that a slow expert causes functional organization to be optimal and vice versa. 
The more interesting parameter was a, and hence the graphs plot variations in a for a fixed P. 
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